SERAP appealsthe N100 million defamation judgment against DSS and seeks a stay of execution.

The Socio‑Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) has lodged an appeal against the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory’s judgment dated 5 May 2026, which ordered SERAP to pay ₦100 million in damages to Department of State Services (DSS) officials. SERAP described the decision as “a travesty and a miscarriage of justice.”

The appeal was filed on 8 May 2026 by Senior Advocate of Nigeria Tayo Oyetibo, acting for SERAP. It is accompanied by an application requesting a stay of execution of the judgment while the appeal is being considered, on the basis that the decision is legally flawed and results in a miscarriage of justice.

SERAP stated that “the Notice of Appeal already filed will be amended upon receipt of the Certified True Copy of the judgment to incorporate key portions of the judgment that further highlight its flawed nature. Pending this, the appeal and the accompanying application for stay of execution already filed and served provide adequate legal protection for our organisation.”

Justice Yusuf Halilu’s judgment ordered SERAP to pay ₦100 million in damages for alleged defamation, to issue public apologies, to cover ₦1 million in litigation costs, and to pay a 10 percent annual post‑judgment interest on the damages until fully satisfied.

In its Notice of Appeal, SERAP contends that “the decision rests on fundamental legal and evidential errors that go to the root of jurisdiction and fairness in adjudication. The court’s decision is therefore perverse and a nullity.”

According to SERAP, “the trial court relied on defective evidence, including a witness statement that was not sworn before a Commissioner for Oaths, which ought to have been discountenanced. The court’s reliance on such evidence substantially affected the outcome of the case.”

SERAP is therefore asking the Court of Appeal for: “an order allowing the appeal; an order setting aside the entire judgment of the High Court of the FCT delivered on 5 May 2026; and an order dismissing the substantive suit (CV/4547/2024) in its entirety for lacking merit.”

SERAP argues that “the appeal is not merely about the outcome of the case, but about whether a court can validly sustain proceedings founded on a defective originating process, or impose liability where the legal thresholds for defamation have not been met.”

SERAP maintains that “the judgment is legally defective, procedurally flawed, and unsupported by evidence, raising substantial questions of jurisdiction, defamation law, and constitutional and international fair‑trial standards.”

SERAP further alleges that “the court failed to apply the well‑established objective test in defamation law, relying instead on subjective perceptions within the DSS rather than the understanding of ordinary members of the public.”

Excerpt from SERAP’s Notice of Appeal: “the lower court erred in law when it allowed the amendment of the Writ of Summons to substitute the name of a non‑juristic person with a juristic person.”

“Particulars of Error: the Respondents instituted this action at the trial Court by initially filing a Writ of Summons against the Socio‑Economic Rights and Accountability Project, a non‑juristic person. The Respondents amended their Writ of Summons to substitute the said non‑juristic entity with the Incorporated Trustees of the Socio‑Economic Rights And Accountability Project.”

“An action commenced against a non‑juristic person is fundamentally defective and does not constitute a misnomer which is capable of amendment. An amendment cannot cure a void originating process nor effect the substitution of a distinct juristic entity for a party that does not exist in law.”

“The decision of the lower court was reached on a misapplication of the relevant legal principles on juristic personality. The lower court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the Respondents’ suit against SERAP.”

“The lower court erred in law in holding that the words complained of were published of and concerning the Claimants personally, contrary to the established objective test for identification in the tort of defamation.”

“Particulars of Error: the lower court failed to apply the objective test laid down by the Supreme Court in Ologe v. New Africa Holdings Ltd and Abalaka v. Akinsete, which requires that words be understood as referring to the claimant by right‑thinking members of society generally, not by a specialised or institutional group.”

“The lower court erroneously relied on the subjective perception of the Respondents and their colleagues within the Department of State Services (the ‘DSS’).”

“The lower court failed to consider the admission of the 1st Respondent under cross‑examination that she is not the only tall, dark‑skinned, large woman in the DSS, and that the 2nd Respondent is not the only slim, dark‑skinned man.”

“The publications complained of did not mention the Respondents by name, rank, photograph, or any unique identifier. The lower court failed to consider the pre‑action letter from the DSS, wherein the DSS acknowledged that the publications were made of and concerning the DSS as an institution, not the individual Respondents, as Claimants.”

“The lower court erred in law by relying on the witness statement on oath of the 1st Respondent when the 1st Respondent admitted under cross‑examination that the said statement was not sworn before a Commissioner for Oaths.”

“Particulars of Error: the law is settled that a witness statement on oath must be signed by the deponent in the presence of the person authorised to administer oaths, failing which the deposition shall be discountenanced.”

“The 1st Respondent admitted under cross‑examination on 21 March 2025 that her witness statement on oath was signed in her lawyer’s chambers and not before the Commissioner for Oaths.”

“Despite the 1st Respondent’s admission, the lower court failed to strike out or discountenance the 1st Respondent’s witness statement on oath for being defective.”

“The lower court relied on the defective witness statement on oath in delivering judgment against SERAP. The defective nature of the 1st Respondent’s witness statement on oath constitutes a fundamental flaw which goes to the substance of the evidence. The lower court’s decision is perverse and a nullity.”

“The lower court erred in law by failing to uphold SERAP’s defences of justification, qualified privilege, and fair comment.”

“Particulars of Error: SERAP