Senegal: Fallout from Faye‑Sonko, IMF Role, and Lessons for Africa

Paul Ejime

In April 2024 we warned that the political partnership between President Diomaye Faye and Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko in Senegal might not endure. Their split after two years has confirmed that prediction, which was grounded in the history of godfatherism in African politics.

Kenneth Kaunda, regarded as the father of Zambia’s independence, governed the country for 27 years before being succeeded by labour leader Frederick Chiluba. In a political move, Chiluba claimed that Kaunda was Malawian, not Zambian—a false assertion that was only reversed two years after Kaunda lost the presidency in 1991.

West Africa is full of examples where godfatherism has backfired, such as the rift between President Adama Barrow and former vice president Ousainou Darboe in the Gambia, Governor Chris Ngige of Nigeria’s Anambra State versus Andy Uba, and Godwin Obaseki versus Adams Oshiomhole of Edo State. Rivers State in Nigeria’s Delta region has the most documented pitfalls in political godfatherism, involving former governors Peter Odili, Rotimi Amaechi, Nysom Wike (now an Abuja minister), and current governor Sim Fubara.

In the spiritual realm of Aso Villa, former presidential spokesman Reuben Abati wrote about “something supernatural about power and closeness to it.” Former Nigerian First Lady Aisha Buhari also blamed powerful “cabals” that “hijacked” the government of her husband, late General Muhammadu Buhari.

Setting aside superstition, Faye and Sonko, both former tax collectors, were friends who rose to power in 2024 on the back of the PASTEF party—the “African Patriots of Senegal for Work, Ethics and Fraternity.” Founded by Sonko, the party maintains a cult following, especially among Senegal’s restless youth.

Established in 2014, PASTEF pledged allegiance “to the fundamental principles and values of the Republic of Senegal, as defined by the Constitution freely adopted by the Senegalese people…” They commit to “strengthening…national unity…” and “consolidation of Senegalese democracy,” and also promise to “contribute to the emancipation…political, cultural and economic unity of the African peoples.”

Sonko’s self‑proclaimed anti‑establishment stance and anti‑corruption campaign cost him his tax administration job. He later served as mayor of Ziguinchor in Casamance, an area home to the MFDC separatist group, which signed a historic peace deal with the Dakar government in 2025.

As a firebrand politician, Sonko clashed repeatedly with the government of former President Macky Sall, who likely had a grudge against him. While a tax administrator, Sonko handled a case involving Sall’s younger brother, Aliou Sall. Four years after Macky Sall assumed the presidency, he issued a decree in August 2016 sacking Sonko from the civil service for “breach of the obligation of professional discretion.”

Sonko contested the 2019 presidential election and finished a surprising third. His ongoing battles with the government earned him a two‑year jail term, which ruled him out of the 2024 presidential vote.

Bassirou Diomaye Faye’s journey from prisoner to Senegal’s youngest president in 20 days is not straightforward. After losing his tax administrator job, he became a freelance opposition activist who also ran into trouble with the authorities and was jailed for “defaming magistrates and contempt of court” over Sonko’s legal trials.

The pair were imprisoned together and released 20 days before the 24 March 2024 presidential election. The Sall regime had also dissolved Sonko’s PASTEF, alleging it had organised violent anti‑government protests. This only strengthened the Sonko‑Faye bond and convinced Sonko to back Faye and rally his supporters behind him. Faye ran as an independent candidate and defeated Sall’s anointed candidate.

Many commentators viewed Sonko’s acceptance of a cabinet post as Prime Minister a political miscalculation, preferring instead to act as kingmaker while Faye served out his mandate. Sonko claimed he offered the position, but Faye rejected it, preferring that both men work as a team in his cabinet. Faye has not refuted this claim.

Perhaps anticipating an inevitable split, Sonko did not resign his parliamentary seat. Shortly after his dismissal as Prime Minister on 22 May 2026, the gulf between the two men deepened. In a “show of popularity,” Sonko returned to parliament, resumed his seat, and, following the resignation of the parliamentary Speaker, assumed that position and has been speaking firmly.

As the more publicly exposed of the duo, Sonko uses his communication and oratory skills to blame Faye for the falling out. He claims he never received any salary as Prime Minister (this has not been contradicted) and that Faye deviated from PASTEF’s philosophy.

Faye is also accused of pursuing a second mandate and allying with the political structure of Macky Sall, his former common foe with Sonko.

Disagreements between Sonko and Faye include Faye’s decision to grant political asylum in Senegal to former Guinea‑Bissau president Umaro Embalo, who organised a self‑military coup in November 2025 to avoid an electoral defeat. Sonko’s objection forced Embalo to flee Dakar for Morocco.

Sonko was believed to have pushed for the closure of French military bases in Senegal and the controversial passing of Senegal’s anti‑LGBT law. He and Faye also disagreed on the management of a special government fund, with Sonko insisting on full public disclosure. The first two measures were poorly received by Paris and its Western allies. Critics of Faye argue he panders too much to France, which he has visited several times since taking office, unlike Sonko’s pan‑Senegal and pan‑African sentiments and insistence on the PASTEF project.

What commentators have not emphasised enough is the possible role played by Macky Sall and France in Senegal’s hidden debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Under Sall’s administration, Senegal accumulated an estimated US$13 billion debt, a debt‑to‑GDP ratio of 132 % at the end of 2024. The Faye‑Sonko government tried to navigate the situation by selling bonds through the Dakar‑based Central Bank of West African States, BCEAO, which uses the CFA franc controlled by the French Treasury. This did not prevent the IMF from suspending its US$1.8 billion credit facility to Senegal required to restore public finances.

IMF conditionality is notorious for subsidy removal, downsizing, currency devaluation, inflation and a high cost of living, resulting in hardship for the poor.

Faye is said to favour fact‑tracking negotiations with the IMF, while Sonko advised caution. Before paying the debt, Senegalese citizens are entitled to ascertain the roles played by Sall and France, why, how and under what conditions it was incurred. African countries have unsavoury experiences of dubious debts accumulated by some governments against national interests.

Faye has since dissolved the Sonko‑led cabinet and replaced it with a new 30‑member structure. Several members of the old cabinet are retained, but PASTEF has boycotted the new government.

With its commanding majority of 130 members in Senegal’s 165‑seat Parliament, PASTEF can censure or frustrate Faye’s government if he chooses to go it alone.

Local elections are scheduled for 2027 ahead of the presidential vote in 2029. Under the constitution, Faye could invoke his presidential powers to dissolve parliament in November, two years after its inauguration, while PASTEF could also use its majority to call for an early vote or impeach the president.

Like Faye, Sonko intends to run for the presidency in 2029. Addressing PASTEF’s Congress after his split with Faye, Sonko claims: “Our (PASTEF) revolution is currently under threat precisely because… not everything that is happening in Senegal at the moment is solely down to internal factors….” However, he insisted: “…no attempt to sabotage this revolution will succeed because the people, standing shoulder to shoulder with PASTEF, will provide the necessary guarantees so that we can finally liberate our country.”

In the interest of Senegal, and to avoid a looming seismic political crisis, Faye and Sonko owe a duty to themselves and the scores of their compatriots who sacrificed their lives or were imprisoned during PASTEF’s national protests that preceded their differences and rose above personal egos.

Also, what is playing out in Senegal is a warning and an instructive lesson to other African countries, including Nigeria, the world’s most populous Black nation, on the dangers of external loans. There might be nothing wrong with debts if only they are incurred transparently and for development‑linked projects, activities or programmes for the common good.

The African alternative framework to structural adjustment programmes (AAF SAP), espoused by Nigeria’s late Professor Adebayo Adedeji in 1989, is still relevant today.

• Ejime is a Global Affairs Analyst and Consultant on Peace & Security and Governance Communication