Reforming the Legal Profession: From Judicial Defiance to Bar Complicity

The Advocate

By Onikepo Braithwaite

Onikepo.braithwaite@thisdaylive.com

The Good Old Days

In Nigeria, the legal profession today differs markedly from the past. Both the Bar and the Bench show signs of decline, and recent events illustrate this deterioration. Last week I discussed controversies surrounding the 2026 Nigerian Bar Association election. This week I focus on the conduct of lawyers and judges.

Abuse of Court Process

Two years ago, while National Judicial Council (NJC) member discussions were active, I spoke with an NJC member about forum shopping and conflicting court orders. Lawyers often introduce flawed matters—such as forum shopping or jurisdictional challenges—into court, creating opportunities for judges to engage in misconduct. I questioned why only petitions can bring errant judges before the NJC, especially in high‑profile cases. I suggested that the NJC should be able to issue a query to any judge accused of judicial misconduct, allowing the judge to explain themselves without waiting for a petition that may be withdrawn under pressure. In Obasanjo & Anor v Olugbode & Ors (2025) LPELR-81518 (SC) per Obande Festus Ogbuinya, JSC, the Supreme Court noted that “the term ‘abuse of court process’ is elusive, exhibiting varied forms, and is disobedient to a single definition… It connotes the proper and improper use of judicial process by a party in litigation, to interfere with the due administration of justice.”

Justice Lifu and the Deregistration of Political Parties: Judicial Rascality

Currently, Federal High Court Judge Peter Lifu J. ordered the deregistration of certain political parties, despite a Court of Appeal stay pending an interlocutory appeal scheduled for October 2026. This disregard for judicial hierarchy has been called judicial rascality. The Court of Appeal cited Owoniyi v Aiyewunmi 2025 16 N.W.L.R. Part 2011 Page 237 per Habeeb Adewale Olumuyiwa Abiru, JSC to describe Lifu J.’s conduct as “the highest form of judicial impertinence.” A full discussion appears in Dr Eyimofe Atake’s article on page 6. Another instance of judicial rascality is the Court of Appeal ruling in the Neconde/Nestoil matter, where an ex‑parte decision was reportedly delivered without the trial court’s record.

First Bank and General Hydrocarbon Limited: Counsel’s Rascality

Lawyers in Nigeria also lack robust disciplinary mechanisms. The Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (LPDC) relies on petitions, but other avenues exist. In England and Wales, judges can refer solicitors to the Solicitors Regulation Authority or barristers to the Bar Standards Board for frivolous or abusive claims. In Nigeria, judges rarely refer counsel for disciplinary action when both parties are involved in abuse of process.

Recall the case of First Bank (FBN) and General Hydrocarbon Ltd (GHL) discussed in January 2025. After Judge Allagoa J. delivered a judgment on 12/12/2024 restraining FBN from obstructing loan facilities for OML 20 and from enforcing security against GHL pending arbitration, the same group of senior advocates representing FBN secretly forum‑shopped for an ex‑parte interim order dated 30/12/24 from Judge Dipeolu J., Allagoa J.’s brother, freezing GHL’s accounts contrary to the earlier judgment. See Okafor & Ors v AG Anambra & Ors (1991) LPELR-2414 (SC) per Adolphus Karibi‑Whyte, JSC on multiplicity of actions on the same subject‑matter.

GHL filed two motions to set aside the ex‑parte order. In his ruling, citing Polaris Bank Ltd v Bellview Airlines Ltd & Anor (2021) LPELR-56258 (CA), Judge Dipeolu J. stated that FBN failed to disclose Allagoa J.’s earlier judgment during the ex‑parte application, withholding material facts that likely would have prevented the order. This conduct amounts to rascality, professional misconduct, and abuse of court process. In the UK, Judge Dipeolu would have referred FBN’s lawyers to the LPDC. GHL could also petition against FBN’s counsel. Why can’t the LPDC query lawyers directly in high‑profile public cases?

Current disciplinary processes for judges and lawyers are ineffective and fail to deter misconduct, especially when extra‑judicial tactics are involved.

Prejudicial Extra‑Judicial Comments: Ms Chimamanda Adichie’s Statement

Abuse of court process also includes trial lawyers making prejudicial extra‑judicial comments that interfere with fair trial. This breaches the ‘sub judice’ rule, Section 33 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners 2023 (RPC). Section 33 applies to trial lawyers, prohibiting prejudicial statements; it does not directly apply to litigants. Lawyers may therefore allow clients to make such statements to gain public sympathy, even if they cannot succeed in court. The 2023 Presidential election petitions and the parallel public opinion trials illustrate this.

It is unclear whether prejudicial extra‑judicial statements fall under abuse of court process—perhaps as ‘contempt ex‑facie curiae’? Opposing counsel can file a “Cease and Desist Notice” to stop a litigant from making inflammatory statements, and a judge may issue a gag order if necessary, as was done for Donald Trump during his pre‑presidency trial.

Recently, I was alerted to a statement by Ms Chimamanda Adichie circulating on social media about her son Nkanu’s death. She began by acknowledging that losing a child is a parent’s worst nightmare, a sentiment I share. Paragraph 15 of her statement reads: “Not long after, an article appeared in the Nigerian press which any reasonable person would assume was orchestrated by Euracare, claiming our son had died of meningitis. It was a cheap and ugly strategy to deflect from the truth.”

Ms Adichie could not have been referring to my article dated 20 January 2026, “Baby Nkanu: Negligence or Meningitis?” because I never stated that meningitis was the cause of death. My article questioned whether an autopsy was necessary to determine the cause, noting that the request for a lumbar puncture and MRI suggested a serious condition. I also noted that an autopsy would be required to determine whether a propofol overdose caused death. I clarified that I was merely examining legal principles and asking pertinent questions.

In her statement, Ms Adichie omitted that, contrary to Section 48(1) of the Coroner’s System Law of Lagos State 2007, Nkanu was cremated before an autopsy could be performed. Cremation in a coroner’s case is a serious offence, punishable by up to 15 years imprisonment. She also noted that Euracare was not approaching the coroner’s inquest scheduled for April with the seriousness required. This omission suggests deflection and gaslighting. Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution guarantees all parties a fair hearing, which requires an autopsy in this case. The Supreme Court in Maikaba v Arto Pharmaceutical Chemist Ltd & Ors (2026) LPELR-83073(SC) per Tijjani Abubakar, JSC held that a breach of the right to a fair hearing renders any proceeding null and void.

Conclusion

The culture of forum shopping, judicial defiance of hierarchy, and unbridled extra‑judicial commentary—illustrated by Justice Lifu, the FBN/GHL saga, and the public discourse around Baby Nkanu’s death—undermines public confidence in justice. When a grieving party cremates a body in a clear coroner’s case, denying the accused hospital an autopsy, the rule of law is eroded. Ignoring such fundamental breaches only compounds injustice.

Structural reform is needed. The NJC and LPDC should move beyond a petition‑driven regime and adopt ‘suo motu’ powers to investigate errant judges and lawyers in high‑profile matters. Discipline that does not deter is ineffective. Only proactive accountability, grounded in due process and professional integrity, can restore the Bar and Bench to the standards of the “good old days” and rebuild public faith in the justice system.