Negotiation Is the Only ViablePath to a Stable Nigerian Union

Richard Ikiebe

Public debate about Nigeria’s future has become increasingly crowded with competing proposals. Two ideas dominate the discussion: the call for outright dissolution of the federation and the demand for a Sovereign National Conference. Both carry strong emotional and political appeal, yet neither is constitutionally sound, logically sustainable, nor practically persuasive. More importantly, they divert attention from the real challenge—and from those most responsible for the current situation: the country’s elite. Nigeria is under severe strain because its leaders have repeatedly refused to undertake the difficult work of genuine negotiation.

A “Sovereign National Conference” is often mentioned as if its mere invocation would solve the nation’s problems. Such a conference would sit above the existing constitutional framework, possessing the power to redesign the state and impose binding decisions without reference to any prior legal order. Nigeria has never convened a conference of that nature in any strict sense. In truth, the country has lacked the discipline, maturity, and organisational capacity required to manage such a process.

What Nigeria has held, at various times, are consultative constitutional conferences that operate within established legal boundaries, generate proposals, and depend entirely on political will for implementation.

It is helpful to distinguish two broad eras of constitutional engagement. The late‑colonial period from 1946 to 1960 focused on creating and structuring a new state; the post‑independence period has been concerned with managing, repairing, and renegotiating that state.

During the pre‑independence years, a coherent model of elite statecraft emerged: leaders gathered in structured settings to negotiate Nigeria’s future on their own terms. The contrast between the achievements of those early gatherings and the largely unmet expectations of post‑independence equivalents offers a stark commentary on the quality of leadership after independence.

The Ibadan Conference of 1950, for example, established the principle that Nigeria’s political structure would be determined through dialogue among its leaders, not by colonial decree. The subsequent London Constitutional Conferences and Lancaster House negotiations built on the Ibadan foundation and ultimately produced the Independence Constitution of 1960.

Those conferences did not resolve every tension—they could not have. They may have been imperfect, entrenching ethno‑regional blocs and deferring minority concerns. Nevertheless, they shared defining characteristics: they were conducted seriously, demanded genuine compromise, and their outcomes were implemented.

By contrast, the record of post‑independence conferences is uneven, marked by evasion and missed opportunities. In moments of acute national crisis, attempts at negotiation were rarely sustained with sufficient discipline or openness.

The Aburi (Ghana) Accord of 1967 illustrates this point starkly. An agreement reached at the highest levels unraveled within weeks due to bad faith, divergent interpretations, and institutional cowardice, leading to a civil war that claimed over a million lives—a direct indictment of elite negligence and its cost to ordinary Nigerians.

Nevertheless, when Nigeria’s leaders have engaged honestly in formally structured settings, they have shown the capacity to produce workable frameworks. The Constituent Assembly produced the 1979 Constitution and introduced a presidential system intended to stabilise competitive federalism, although questions such as the precise meaning of “federal character” remained unresolved.

Later initiatives, including the Vision 2010 Committee and the 2014 National Conference, demonstrated that elites could diagnose problems and reach consensus on solutions. The reports from these conferences are substantive and sophisticated, yet they also revealed a persistent lack of political will for implementation. Recommendations were drafted, volumes were ceremonially received, but momentum dissipated.

This pattern of failure appears to be the result of deliberate choices by identifiable individuals in positions of power who benefit from the disorder their efforts were meant to resolve. The record points to a deficit of political courage among those entrusted to act on the outcomes of dialogue or to implement solutions.

In contrast, the United States’ Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787, despite its own compromises and moral shortcomings, is often cited because it established a durable habit of structured elite bargaining and, crucially, an institutional follow‑through. The longevity of the American union rests less on any single document than on a governing elite that accepted accountability for what it agreed.

Crucially, Nigeria’s ruling elite has not consistently accepted such accountability, especially when it mattered most. The current national debate must therefore move beyond reductive binaries of breakup versus unity, or sovereignty versus consultation. The elite must confront the bitter truth that a credible negotiation process requires a clearly defined scope and a binding pathway to implementation. They must recognise that convening a national conference and honouring its outcomes are not the same act, and they must avoid confusing the theatre of dialogue with its substance.

Eighty years of striving to build Nigeria have been a long, arduous task. The country cannot be rebuilt by sporadic slogans in broken tongues. The foundation was set through hard negotiations and will only be sustained in the same way. This responsibility belongs squarely and without qualification to those who hold power. Nigeria’s elite must return to the table, speak candidly across divides, and do so with full awareness of what evasion has already cost. They must see dialogue and negotiation through to the end.

• Dr Richard Ikiebe is a Media and Management Consultant, Teacher and Chairman, Board of Businessday Newspaper