De-registering or Dismissing a Political Party: The Cases of Benin and Guinea‑Bissau

Bola A. Akinterinwa

Deregistration is one of the sanctions often imposed on political parties that breach critical provisions of the electoral code. Some electoral laws require parties to secure a certain number of parliamentary seats or meet constitutional performance benchmarks; failure to do so can lead to deregistration. Inactivity can also be a basis for sanction. In early 2025, 53 inactive parties were deregistered by South Africa’s Electoral Commission because they failed to renew registrations, field candidates, or respond to official enquiries. Similarly, Zambia’s Electoral Commission and the Registrar of Societies have deregistered non‑compliant parties for reasons such as not holding conventions, failing to update office bearers, or not providing required information.

More importantly, a party cannot be deregistered if it was never initially registered and recognized. Registration is the legal process that allows electoral bodies to supervise candidate sponsorship, elections, and governance. While registration requirements vary by country, common elements include a list of verifiable members or sponsors, evidence of geographic spread, a constitution that promotes democratic culture and national unity and aligns with the national constitution, and payment of a non‑refundable fee.

Generally, the conditions for registration are not the reasons for deregistration. Reasons for deregistration often stem from strategic political calculations or party infractions. When parties are deregistered, disorder and insecurity can follow, as seen in Guinea Bissau and Benin Republic in 2025.

De‑registration in International Relations

In Nigeria, six major requirements must be met for an association to be recognized as a political party. First, the association must complete INEC’s designated forms. Second, it must pay N50 million in administrative processing costs. Third, it must provide evidence of federal character, showing no regional or ethnic dominance in its national and state executive committees. Fourth, the party’s name and symbols must not conflict with those of an already registered party or carry religious, professional, or ethnic connotations. Fifth, the party must locate its national headquarters in the Federal Capital Territory. Sixth, it must present a membership list that is open to all Nigerians regardless of origin, ethnicity, gender, or religion.

Additional requirements include submitting about fifty copies of the registration application, names of all national and state executive committee members, minutes of meetings where executive members were elected, the party’s constitution, the minutes approving the proposed name, the manifesto, and the logo. After name search, fee payment, and form submission, INEC conducts a 60‑day verification process. If no doubts remain, a Certificate of Registration is issued. However, this certificate is not permanent; it can be withdrawn if an infraction is identified.

The National Forum of Former Legislators (NFFL) filed a case against INEC, asking the court to deregister five parties that allegedly failed to meet constitutional requirements under Section 225(a). On 15 June 2026, Justice Peter Lifu of the Federal High Court in Abuja ordered INEC to deregister five opposition parties: African Democratic Congress (ADC), Accord (A), Action Alliance (AA), Action Peoples Party (APP), and Zenith Labour Party (ZLP). INEC opposed the case as a co‑defendant and agreed with the appellate court that a stay of execution of Justice Lifu’s judgment was necessary.

Court rulings on party registration and recognition are often contentious in Nigeria. For example, the 21 April 2007 presidential elections were described by European Union observers as “the worst they had ever seen anywhere in the world,” marred by vote rigging, violence, and ballot‑box theft. INEC had declared Alhaji Atiku Abubakar ineligible to run because the Constitution barred any indicted candidate. A High Court later ruled that INEC had no legal capacity to disqualify a candidate; the Appeal Court disagreed, and the Supreme Court ultimately held that INEC lacked constitutional power to disqualify candidates, allowing Abubakar to run. This sequence illustrates how legal interpretations can be politically charged.

Justice Lifu’s decision to deregister the five parties appears legally grounded in Section 225(a) requirements, yet it was made without complying with a higher court order that had directed a stay of his proceedings. The Court of Appeal later set aside his judgment, citing his disregard for the appellate order and his judicial impertinence. Whether the decision was purely legal or politically motivated remains debated, especially given President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s reputation as a strategist who may influence judicial outcomes to weaken opposition parties ahead of the 2027 general elections.

Justice Lifu’s judgment was based on the fact that the deregistered parties failed to secure the constitutionally required 25 % of votes in 2023, as stipulated in Section 225(a). He also noted that no valid stay had been served on his court by the time of judgment. The Court of Appeal’s unanimous reversal suggests that the primary issue was his non‑compliance with the appellate order rather than the merits of the deregistration itself.

The Cases of Guinea Bissau and Benin Republic

In Guinea Bissau, President Umaro Sissoco Emballo dissolved the legislature in 2023 and, before the 26 November 2025 general elections, the Supreme Court barred the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) from participating. The political environment became fragile and autocratic. Emballo’s government was accused of faking a coup d’état to remain in power, a claim supported by the fact that Emballo was allowed to travel to Senegal immediately after the alleged coup. General Horta Inta‑A was installed as president for one year, and political stability has remained elusive.

On 19 June 2026, opposition leader Domingos Simoes Pereira, who had been house‑arrested since the November 2025 coup, was still detained. Portugal called for his release, but the Bissau government rejected the request, citing interference in domestic affairs. Pereira had been preparing to run as the PAIGC’s main opposition candidate before the party was barred from the election. A military court ordered his continued house‑arrest on allegations of coup plotting, a claim that many find dubious. The situation highlights how political chicanery can undermine democratic processes in Africa.

In Benin Republic, President Patrice Talon excluded Les Démocrates, the main opposition party, from the April 2026 elections. The ban was not accompanied by violence, reflecting a culture of pursuing change through political and civil society action rather than force. Talon’s ally, Romuald Wadagni, won the presidential election in April 2026 with over 94 % of the vote, though turnout was low due to the tense political climate. The election left the country divided, with widespread dismissals from state media, poverty, limited access to basic services, and food insecurity. Talon’s erosion of political freedoms has reduced his popularity despite economic growth.

Both Guinea Bissau and Benin Republic illustrate how deregistration or exclusion of major opposition parties can precipitate coups or political instability. When a party is deregistered, it can no longer field candidates, its members are disenfranchised, and the party ceases to exist as a legal entity. This reduces democratic space and pluralism. Reversing such deregistrations, where no technical legal fault is evident, may help mitigate political tension and preserve democratic norms.