Civil Service Commission Delegated Powers and the Debate Over Decentralized HRM

By Tunji Olaopa

In 2024, the Federal Civil Service Commission (FCSC) began preparing the implementation of its Strategic Plan for 2026‑2030. The 10th Commission was inaugurated by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu in December 2023 with a clear mandate: “competently facilitate the transformation, reorientation and digitization of the federal bureaucracy to enable, and not stifle, growth and enhance private sector participation in the development of the Nigerian economy, in full adherence to the Renewed Hope agenda.” The FCSC took this order seriously because it aligns with the Tinubu administration’s goal of transforming democratic governance through the Renewed Hope Agenda and with the constitutional duty of the FCSC to serve as the gate‑keeping body that transforms the civil service into a vocational, value‑oriented and efficient institution for delivering public goods to Nigerians. In other words, the FCSC sits at the intersection of the urgent need to reform the civil service system and the administration’s aim to improve citizens’ lives through efficient democratic governance.

To translate the marching order into a change‑management trajectory, the FCSC launched a critical repositioning plan in 2024. This plan is intended to clean up the system in preparation for the strategic plan and the broad reform framework that will transform the structural, institutional and procedural dynamics of Nigeria’s civil service. As the FCSC moves through the phases of implementing the strategic plan, it is important to examine a fundamental issue that affects the constitutional powers of federal and state civil service commissions and how those powers can be used to drive institutional reform, performance and productivity. My aim in this piece is to explore: What is the constitutional limit of the powers that the CSCs possess? How can these powers be applied to achieve institutional reform, performance and productivity? What lessons can be drawn from global best practices and administrative discourse? How can these lessons be adapted to Nigeria’s administrative context? I hope these questions will enlighten colleagues and scholars of public administration about the significance of federal and state CSCs, especially in the context of the Renewed Hope Agenda.

A key part of the reform process concerns how powers are legitimised, owned and delegated for effective performance. Modernising the FCSC’s operations, procedures, structures, processes and regulations requires a clear understanding of its constitutional powers and how they should be deployed for effective planning and implementation. How should federal and state CSCs manage their constitutional powers? How do ministries and departments calculate constitutional authority? How should HR functions be delegated if CSCs exercise the full powers conferred by the constitution? These questions feed into the global debate on centralisation versus decentralisation of HR functions.

Given the gate‑keeping mandate of the CSC, it is essential to tightly control human resource functions such as recruitment, hiring, promotions and discipline. A centralised operational procedure, through a central personnel agency, can protect the civil service system from corruption, patronage and politicisation while upholding meritocratic standards. Consequently, CSCs must decide whether to decentralise their constitutional powers or retain them within a centralised framework that the constitution permits. Unfortunately, administrative realities often undermine idealistic aspirations.

Historically, the choice between centralised and decentralised HR functions has been mediated by ideological considerations, reflecting either a liberal‑market philosophy or a more centralised guided governance model. Those who favour centralisation argue that decentralised functions may quickly succumb to corrupt practices that undermine the CSC’s gate‑keeping role. However, two critical facts must not be overlooked. First, the relationship between centralisation and decentralisation is a continuum. Although the British model of the CSC began with centralised HR governance, post‑World War II CSCs had to adapt to administrative developments such as the expansion of the state, the complexity of development management in a globalised world and the emergence of New Public Management (NPM) in the 1980s. In the British Commonwealth, NPM showed that a centralised HR model led to slow recruitment and poor accountability. This prompted the view that managers must be empowered to manage and be held accountable for performance outcomes that improve citizens’ lives.

Practical administrative history has shown that the CSC’s constitutional mandate for HR functions should be split between the central agency and line ministries. A central agency that makes HR decisions for the entire system often lacks the efficiency and understanding of local units and their specific needs, particularly in staffing decisions and performance management. Therefore, CSCs tend to centralise staffing decisions for senior staff and ethical matters, while day‑to‑day personnel management, operational staffing and administrative duties are decentralised to line ministries and departments. Decentralisation focuses on achieving organisational efficiency by locating decision‑making closer to service delivery points and, ultimately, to citizens.

In Nigeria, Decree 43 of 1988, which underpinned the Babangida Civil Service Reforms, decentralised personnel management to line ministries, aiming to transform the civil service into a professional, performance‑oriented institution. Ministers, as accounting officers, were empowered to handle recruitment, promotion and discipline. However, the reform faced significant challenges: widespread politicisation of senior positions, reduced job security, a weakened career structure, and increased political interference that eroded the neutrality originally protected by the CSC. The decentralised model dispersed internal management control, leading to inconsistent standards, administrative abuses and ethnic discrimination.

Despite these limitations, decentralisation plays a critical role in Nigeria’s push for democratic governance. Decentralisation supports the NPM principle that managers need discretionary power to manage effectively and is a core element of democratic governance that any administrative system must address to achieve performance. However, the FCSC’s decentralisation of HR functions must be carefully designed to avoid the pitfalls of Decree 43.

To move beyond the centralisation versus decentralisation debate, the FCSC should focus on operational questions that will shape the implementation of the strategic plan and align with its constitutional powers: (a) how extensive should decentralisation of HR functions be? (b) which HR functions should have service‑wide standards? (c) which HR functions should be delegated to individual line ministries? (d) what role should the CSCs play in a decentralised system, regardless of its extent? These questions help federal and state CSCs develop a robust administrative framework that balances constitutional provisions with practical realities.

In summary, fully centralising HR functions under the CSC’s constitutional powers would be an administrative and institutional mistake. It would contradict global best practices and repeat errors that many states have already avoided. The Renewed Hope Agenda demands that the CSC take cues from contemporary administrative discourse to achieve meaningful reform.

*Prof. Tunji Olaopa is the Chairman, Federal Civil Service Commission, Abuja