2027: Why the NDC under Seriake Dickson cannot become a viable ruling party

Senator Seriake Dickson, founder and leader of the Nigerian Democratic Congress (NDC), has allied with Peter Obi and Rabiu Kwankwaso, the party’s presidential flag‑bearer and running mate. The partnership appears to be one of convenience rather than genuine alignment. Obi and Kwankwaso, lacking a strong political base, have turned to Dickson’s NDC for a vehicle to the presidency, while the NDC seeks a capable driver. This uneasy union raises concerns about the stability of any government that might emerge from it in 2027.

Before assessing the potential dysfunction of an NDC presidency, it is necessary to examine whether the party can realistically produce a president in 2027. A structural review shows parallels between the NDC and the former Alliance for Democracy (AD), a regional South‑West party that attempted to secure the presidency in 1999. Senator Dickson was the first national legal adviser of the AD, and his approach to building the NDC mirrors the AD’s strategy of creating a regional party with national ambitions. Both parties have also imposed strict controls on their members, as seen in the NDC’s recent anti‑defection oath for aspirants.

In 1999, the AD allied with the northern‑based All People’s Party (APP) and fielded Chief Olu Falae, a former secretary to the government of the federation and later finance minister, as its presidential candidate, with Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi, a former internal affairs minister, as his running mate. The Falae‑Shinkafi ticket received 11,110,287 votes (37.22 %) compared to PDP’s Olusegun Obasanjo, who secured 18,738,154 (62.78 %). In the National Assembly elections, the alliance won 49 Senate seats – 20 for AD and 29 for APP – and 142 House seats – 68 for AD and 74 for APP. The AD‑APP coalition lacked the national reach required to win the presidency and dominate the National Assembly.

The NDC’s Obi‑Kwankwaso ticket resembles the AD‑Falae‑Shinkafi pairing: a minority or regional party attempting to claim the presidency and control the legislature without a truly national outlook. Unlike the 1999 election, where the AD was one of only two parties in a de‑facto national consensus to zone the presidency to the South‑West, the NDC will face Bola Tinubu from the South‑West and Atiku Abubakar, the sole northern candidate, in 2027. A small party without a broad national base is unlikely to succeed in a presidential race, just as the AD struggled in 1999, despite the strength of its ticket.

Supporters of Obi, the “Obidients,” argue that he transcends party lines and enjoys sufficient national recognition to win a free and fair election. However, winning the presidency is distinct from governing. In 2023, Obi secured 6,101,533 votes nationwide and won 12 states, yet Labour won only eight of the 109 Senate seats and 34 of the 360 House seats. Popularity alone does not translate into legislative power; a strong national party with a robust grassroots network is essential to secure both the presidency and parliamentary control. The NDC lacks this capacity.

Thus, the first reason the NDC cannot be a viable ruling party is its limited parliamentary presence. Even if Obi and Kwankwaso were to surpass their 2023 vote totals and win the presidency in 2027, the NDC would still hold only a handful of seats in the Senate and House. Governing without a majority would either lead to gridlock or require widespread defections, which would undermine the credibility of an Obi administration. The NDC’s recent mandate that all aspirants to legislative office swear an anti‑defection affidavit underscores its recognition of this weakness. The oath suggests the party cannot win the presidency and is concerned about legislators defecting to the ruling party—a scenario that would be hypocritical if the NDC were the governing party. Moreover, the Constitution already regulates unlawful defections, making the NDC’s additional affidavits redundant and unenforceable. This lack of discipline further diminishes the party’s viability.

The second reason is the likelihood of internal conflict. As a ruling party, the NDC would be fractured by rivalries between Senator Dickson, a former governor of Bayelsa State who claims ownership of the party, and a President Obi who would likely see himself as the party’s leader. Obi’s fervent supporters, the “Obidients,” would view Obi’s victory as personal rather than a triumph for the NDC, exacerbating tensions. These rifts could paralyze decision‑making and weaken the administration.

Senator Dickson’s recent interview with Charles Aniagolu on Arise TV illustrates this dynamic. Dickson, initially calm, reacted sharply when Aniagolu suggested that Obi needed the NDC to succeed. Dickson declared, “I could have run; nobody is more qualified than me to run for the presidency of Nigeria; none!” He warned, “You cannot be supporting Peter Obi and disparaging me, the leader and the platform itself. That’s nonsensical.” Aisha Yesufu, a prominent Obidient, responded on Twitter, accusing Dickson of insecurity and competition with Obi. The exchange highlights the fragile nature of the alliance.

In short, the NDC’s reliance on a partnership with Obi and Kwankwaso, its limited parliamentary strength, its questionable internal discipline, and the potential for deep internal divisions all undermine its prospects as a viable ruling party in 2027.

*Dr Fasan is the author of ‘In The National Interest: The Road to Nigeria’s Political, Economic and Social Transformation’, available at RovingHeights bookstores.